Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call on Independence Day for India to become self-sufficient in fertilisers carries undeniable political weight. But behind the stated goal lies the harsher truth that India’s fertiliser economy is, and will remain, deeply reliant on imports.
The country lacks the mineral reserves to produce its own phosphates or potash, and even the urea it manufactures domestically rests on imported natural gas. What we proudly call indigenous fertiliser is, in reality, inseparably tied to foreign inputs.
The scale of dependence is sobering. More than 80 per cent of phosphatic raw material, the entirety of potash, and nearly three-fourths of the feedstock for urea come from abroad.
Fertiliser consumption has soared, reaching record levels in 2024–25, and imports continue to fill the gap. Nearly half of DAP and all of potash consumed by Indian farmers are imported. To suggest that India can eliminate this reliance through incremental policy tweaks is to ignore both geology and economics.
Sales of all four key types of chemical fertilisers were at an all-time high 655.94 lakh tonne (lt) in FY25 as against 600.79 lt in FY24, up by 9.2 per cent. Sales of Urea stood at 387.92 lt, Di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) at 96.28 lt, Muriate of Potash (MOP) at 22.02 lt and Complex (combination of all nutrients) at 149.72 lt.
Import of urea, entirely controlled by the government, was recorded at 56.47 lt in 2024-25 as against 70.42 lt in the year-ago period, a fall of 19.8 per cent. There was record import of urea at 98.28 lt during 2020-21.
Import of DAP too dipped 17.1 per cent to 45.69 lt from 55.14 lt. But MOP import surged 29.8 per cent to 27.34 lt from 21.06 lt and complex rose 3.9 per cent at 22.72 lt from 21.87 lt.
Share of import in sales during FY25 was 14.6 per cent in urea, 47.5 per cent in DAP, 124.2 per cent in MOP and 15.2 per cent in Complex.
In 2012-13, the share of import in the demand was 26.8 per cent in urea, 62.3 per cent in DAP, 91.9 per cent in MOP and 5.4 per cent in Complex. Back then, sales of urea were 300.02 lt, DAP 91.54 lt, MOP 22.11 lt and complex 75.27 lt.
At best, the country can supplement the overall demand with some organic nutrients, for which also a necessary policy framework is yet to be developed, an industry expert said.
Import of overall fertilisers fell 9.7 per cent to 152.22 lt in FY25 from 168.49 lt in FY24, not due to any decline in consumption, rather the government’s discouragement for it as sales have been rising.
“As the fertiliser usage has more than doubled since 2012-13, so as the feedstock requirement due to non-availability of sufficient gas from domestic sources. Currently, the fertiliser companies are importing 77 per cent of their feedstock requirement to produce urea whereas in 2012-13 the share of domestic gas was 76 per cent and only 24 per cent got imported,” said a top official of a leading fertiliser company. The entire increased demand in last couple of years has been met through import, he added.
Where India does have a choice is in how it manages this dependence. Yet here the government’s record is one of misplaced priorities and half measures. The big-ticket initiatives of the past decade—neem-coated urea, smaller bag sizes, the PM-PRANAM scheme—have done little to alter consumption trends.
Far from moving toward moderation, fertiliser use has risen year after year. The state has fallen back on crude rationing, limiting how much fertiliser a farmer can buy in a season. Some states have further put a limit on quantity that farmers can buy at a time and in a month.
In a repeat of the past, there are long queues outside retail points of fertilisers and police action against farmers. Predictably, this has recreated the shortages and queues that the BJP once weaponised against the UPA.
At a recent meeting with union agriculture minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan, many state agriculture ministers pleaded with him to intervene and ensure that at least the indented quantity of fertilisers is supplied. The fertiliser ministry officials, instead of admitting their failure, passed on the blame to “geo-political tensions”, which convinced no stakeholder, least of all the aggrieved states, sources said.
The failures are not only technical, but structural. Fertilisers are governed by a separate ministry in Delhi, while states place them under agriculture. This split serves no purpose except to multiply inefficiency. Experts have long argued that fertilisers should be folded into the agriculture ministry, chemicals into petroleum, pharmaceuticals into health. Yet the fertiliser ministry continues to exist, more as a legacy of administrative inertia than a vehicle for reform. Unless the architecture of governance itself is rationalised, India’s fertiliser policy will remain disjointed and reactive.
The deeper crisis, however, lies in the soil. Decades of indiscriminate fertiliser use have begun to poison the land, undermining long-term productivity. In districts with the highest fertiliser use, the obvious step would be to mandate drastic reductions, while compensating farmers for any loss of yield. Instead, policy has been timid, shielding these high-yield areas from even small experiments for fear of political backlash. The focus has shifted to low-use zones, where interventions make little difference. By refusing to confront the problem at its source, the government risks allowing India’s most fertile soils to degrade beyond repair.
There are alternatives. Organic manure, bio-fertilisers, and green ammonia could together replace up to 30 per cent of chemical fertiliser use if backed by a coherent policy. But that would require more than slogans. It would demand subsidies for organic alternatives on par with urea and DAP, crop insurance to protect farmers from income loss, and genuine space for private innovation. Instead, the government continues to suffocate the sector with rigid price controls and profit caps that deter investment. The message to industry is clear: take risks, but don’t expect the freedom to profit from them.
Meanwhile, opportunities are squandered. India produces green ammonia, but only for export, since the government has not yet approved it for agricultural use. Organic manure production has increased, but still covers less than 8 per cent of the country’s sown area. These gaps reflect not a lack of potential, but a lack of urgency and imagination in policy.
The Prime Minister is right about one thing: indiscriminate fertiliser use is harming both soil and farmers. But his call for self-sufficiency obscures the larger truth. India cannot free itself from fertiliser imports; it can only manage them smarter, reduce their weight, and build alternatives. That requires courage, not cosmetics: a willingness to restructure ministries, overhaul subsidies, experiment in high-use districts, and trust the private sector with real freedom.
Until then, the dream of self-sufficiency will remain just that—a dream. India will continue to consume more, import more, and watch its soil degrade, even as its leaders talk of atmanirbharta. The gap between rhetoric and reality will grow, and the costs will be borne not in Delhi, but in the fields where farmers stand in line for fertilisers that the country has failed to truly reimagine.
Published on August 21, 2025